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Abstract
This paper is principally concerned with explaining the causes, course, and outcome of the Polish-Soviet War
of 1919-1921. It provides a background of the reasoning behind both camps’ geo-political motivations leading
up to the conflict. Although the background of the conflict is largely explored by this paper, some basic
understanding of the situation is assumed. The paper goes on to describe the major events of the conflict and
its results, with a strong emphasis on the Battle of Warsaw. Finally, the paper provides a narrative as to how the
conflict influenced the foreign policies of both nations during the interwar era.
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 In 1920, Eastern Europe was in a state of disarray. The three great powers 
that had controlled and dominated Poland since the Third Partition in 1795 had 
fallen. Imperial Russia officially collapsed in October 1917, though it had lost 
control of Poland to the Germans over a year earlier. With the end of World War 
One came the end of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. This left a 
power vacuum of massive proportions. Despite French and British attempts at 
diplomatic control and manipulation,1 Eastern Europe descended into a period of 
warfare and haphazard nation-building. From this turbulent situation came two 
new nations: Poland and the Soviet Union. The conflict between these two powers 
was to have far reaching implications for not just the countries involved and the 
surrounding area, but also the whole of Europe.  
To understand the conflict between these two nascent powers, one must 
understand the background of the situation. When German hegemony over 
Eastern Europe ended, the Germans loosened their grip only grudgingly. Even 
after the official armistice of November 11th, 1918, German troops continued to 
have a presence in many of the countries that they had occupied during the war. 
Finland and the Baltic states had active German paramilitary forces in them, 
supporting anti-communist forces.2 In addition to conflicts in formerly controlled 
areas, Germany faced a revolution brewing at home and withdrew as a 
functioning power in Eastern Europe shortly after the end of World War One.3   
Defeated, but not conquered, Russia was in an interesting position come 
the end of World War One. Once the Bolsheviks attained a basic, de facto control 
in what had been Imperial Russia, they moved to make peace with Germany. 
Lenin did not want to inherit a losing international war; he wanted to secure his 
own domain first and foremost. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Soviet 
Union and Germany was signed in February 1918, before World War One ended, 
and left Eastern Europe to the machinations of the Germans.4 Suppressing the 
White movement at home was a higher priority for Lenin than fighting a 
revolutionary war against the Central Powers. It is important to note that, despite 
the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Lenin was never really an isolationist5 – 
designs on a world revolution came with his idealist, revolutionary background. 
The idea of permanent Marxist revolution dated to 1850 and was strongly 
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 supported by Trotsky.6 The fundamental Soviet position was that the revolution 
was an inevitability of history and that all nations would come under its banner 
eventually. The date when Lenin turned his eyes abroad, however, came sooner 
than expected.  
Onto this stage, the Soviets started to expand. Starting in late 1918, the 
Soviets attempted to recapture territories formerly held by Imperial Russia in the 
Baltic, the Caucasus, and the Ukraine.7 The westward prong of this wave of 
Soviet expansionism was the result of two motivations. It is important to note that 
the Soviets had not, at this time, stamped out the Whites. To some in Soviet 
leadership, this push westwards was simply part of the Civil War, reclaiming 
rightful territory. To others, it was part of an international game with the 
intervention-oriented West.8 The two lines of Soviet thinking revolved around 
somewhat competing narratives: one being the recapture of territory which was 
previously controlled by the Russian Empire, the destruction of the White 
Movement, and the strengthening of the economy.9 The other narrative 
emphasized the importance of world revolution. 
 The position supporting world revolution was candidly articulated by 
General Budyonny at the Second Comintern Congress -- which convened shortly 
before the Battle of Warsaw. In a statement to the Congress, he said, “We will be 
happy on the day when, together with the proletariat of the West, we will enter 
into a decisive battle with the world bourgeoisie, when our army will receive its 
operational orders from Red Paris, Berlin, or London.”10 During the early days of 
the Soviet state, there was an influential belief that Marxist ideology should be 
spread throughout the world and capitalism everywhere should be eradicated. 
This was the doctrine of permanent revolution.11 The Soviets were hungry at the 
notion of expansion. Further enticing the Soviets to act at this time was the fact 
that Germany and Hungary experienced failed communist revolutions in the 
aftermath of World War One.12 In the Soviet mindset, there were proletarians 
willing and wanting to be liberated in Germany and Hungary. Thomas Fiddick 
writes that Lenin was, “highly optimistic about the possibilities of exporting 
revolution into Germany during the spring of 1920.”13 Marx did predict that the 
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 Revolution would come in an industrialized nation, after all.14 The only question 
was how to link up with these revolutions. Poland stood in the way and for that, it 
needed to be crushed. The tide of world revolution was to move on to an 
ostensibly ripe Germany. 
 As the successor state to the Russian Empire, the Soviets felt, to some 
degree, to have claim to the former territory of the Empire. This included Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Moldova. With the 
exception of Finland, Soviet foreign policy towards these nations was directly 
predatory at this time. From the creation of the Soviet Union to the collapse of it, 
these nations were seen as part of an ironic imperial destiny. To the Soviets, it 
was natural that these people and their territory be a part of the “motherland.” 
Their right to national determination was not recognized as being legitimate. 
Poland, being formerly part of the Russian Empire, was not immune to these 
thoughts. 
 The Poles, however, wanted no part of these grandiose Soviet designs and 
pronouncements of coming utopia. They saw national enemies, not class brothers 
amongst the Soviets. The Poles, their foreign policy largely dictated by Chief of 
State Pilsudski, wanted to create a buffer between themselves and Soviet power. 
Germany and Russia, for the last 125 years, had occupied Poland and denied its 
people their nationhood. As such, it is understandable that the primary concern of 
Polish foreign policy would be to secure a strong defensive position, so as to 
avoid any future Partitions. Pilsudski wanted to create a confederation of states in 
Eastern Europe ranging from Finland to the Black Sea, with Poland leading. This 
federation would serve as a buffer to the expansionist Soviets – defeated Germany 
was less of a concern. Pilsudski, in effect, wanted to recreate the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. This coalition would be guided by Poland, but still be 
a federal state.15 A key component of this plan was Ukraine. Western Ukraine had 
a large number of ethnic Poles living in it and was historically part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. Also, detaching the Ukraine from the Soviet Union 
would deal the Soviets a heavy loss of population and territory – their 
“breadbasket” would be cut out.    
It was for these reasons that Polish forces advanced into independent 
Ukraine in late 1918.16 The Ukrainian independence/nationalist movement was 
standing in the way of Pilsudski’s grand rebirth of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Pilsudski and the Poles were more than willing to take their 
chunk of western Ukraine by force. The war went well for Poland. Though the 
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 Poles did not occupy the whole of the Ukraine, they did take the western section 
of it. The Soviets pounced on the eastern half of Ukraine along a similar 
timeframe. By February 1919, the independence of Ukraine was over and war was 
inevitable between the Soviets and Poles.  
Polish forces initially achieved stunning success. When they advanced on 
the Red Army in the summer of 1920, Soviet resistance was light. The Red Army 
was still dealing with White forces in Crimea and had notable desertion 
problems.17 The Red Army was pushed back beyond Kiev. In classic Russian 
fashion, they traded space for time and allowed the invaders to become 
overextended. Kiev was as far as the Polish invasion got. Nationalist fervor 
increased18 and the Red Army managed to stabilize and reorganize itself. One 
million A.W.O.L. soldiers returned,19  in addition to a large number of formerly 
White officers.20 Because of this, the tide turned and the Poles were chased back 
beyond the prewar borders.  
Advancing rapidly, Soviet forces made straight for the Polish capital of 
Warsaw. While a number of Soviet forces under Stalin were preoccupied with 
taking Lviv,21 the main thrust of the Soviet counteroffensive centered on a two-
pronged pincer to the north and south of Warsaw. In this, Marshal Pilsudski saw 
an opportunity. He attacked unexpectedly on the southern front with rejuvenated 
forces. Nationalism and open Western support bolstered Polish morale. Around 
Nasielsk, General Sikorski broke the back of the Soviet northern army; the 
southern one was dispersed shortly after.22 Not even Marshal Budyonny’s 
celebrated 1st Cavalry could stem the tide; it was defeated in the Battle of 
Komarow.23 Soviet forces were in serious disarray after the battle, their 
communication had broken down and they were routing. The Poles had won a 
great victory. Considering how on-their-heels the Poles had been and how 
complete a victory it was, the battle was christened the “Miracle at the Vistula.” 
There are several reasons for the Polish victory. The Poles had excellent 
cryptography, which allowed them to decode Soviet communications.24 This 
information helped in Polish planning. Though the level of their contribution to 
the Polish victory are disputed, French military advisors, along with other 
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 Western troops helped the Polish cause.25 Also contributing to the Polish victory 
was simple nationalism. It was clear that if the Red Army took Warsaw, the entire 
Polish state would be in jeopardy of being overrun. Pilsudski successfully 
gathered his forces around the most patriotic narrative imaginable, the last stand 
around one’s capital. The Red Army, by contrast, was extended beyond its normal 
area of operations and did not enjoy the same kind of localized numerical 
superiority that it had become accustomed to. Additionally, the Soviet 
commanders Tukhachevsky and Budyonny did not cooperate or coordinate their 
commands.26 A lack of mutual support between the Soviet forces hampered them 
to a severe degree.   
The Polish-Soviet War defined the borders and relationships between the 
countries of Eastern Europe for a generation. The failure of the Soviets to spread 
their revolution beyond the Russian-speaking world led to roughly twenty years 
of tempered internationalism. Lenin began to focus his efforts on the New 
Economic Policy. The Soviets were quiet, preferring to develop their economy 
than to expand abroad. Victorious Poland, on the other hand, did not take all of 
the territory that it could have during the negotiations for the Peace of Riga. For 
Poland, the decision after the great victory of Warsaw to create a state out of 
mostly ethnic lines was monumental. Though Pilsudski wanted to craft a unitary, 
multicultural state, he was forced to temper his demands due to internal politics 
and the reality that he could not afford to fight a prolonged war against the 
Soviets. He did get a significantly larger area than what the Western Allies had 
defined as being Polish initially following World War One, but not enough to 
make his unitary state happen.27 Poland was not to develop a second Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. Poland allowed itself to become a small nation-state; 
the Soviets spent the next twenty years in relative isolation. Had Poland taken 
more territory from the Soviets, it may not have fallen to the Nazis in 1939; had 
Poland fallen to the Soviets in 1920, the history of not only Europe, but the world, 
would have been profoundly different.     
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